2009年1月23日 星期五

LB443-446 T

Parmenides, (fifth century B.C.) thought that originally names had been given to things on the basis of “wrong thinking,” and that the continued use of the original names perpetuated the errors of men’s earlier thinking about the objects around them. To him, and to Anaxagoras and Empedokles, names and concepts were synonymous. Their concern with conventional names and their condemnation of them as nomos was related to their critical view of conventional thought. To these philosophers nomos and conventional thought had acquired the connotation of incorrectness and inadequacy as opposed to the truth and real nature or physis which they were seeking [5].
翻譯:
帕梅尼德斯(公元前五世紀)認為,最初對事物的命名是建立在“錯誤思想”的基礎上,並且延續使用最早的名稱使得人類先前對周圍事物的錯誤看法一直存在著。對他以及對Axaxagoras和Empedokles 來說,名稱和概念是同等的。他們對這些傳統名稱的關注及譴責就是他們對常規思想持批判看法的規則。對這些哲學家來說,概念和常規思想是從錯誤和貧乏的內涵取得,相反於他們正尋找的真理和自然的真正本質[ 5 ] 。

原文:
Pindar(522-433 B.C.) considered all of man’s true abilities innate. They cannot be acquired by learning but can only be furthered by training[6]. For him the rules of society which are nomos were God-given and, therefore, contained absolute truth. Nomos and physis were not purely antithetical as it was for Parmenides and his school. It is also well to keep in mind that nomos and physis had not been antithetical in Greek ethnography. Nomos referred to all peculiarities of a people due to custom and not attributable to the influences of climate, country, or food. So Herodotus had ascribed the elongated heads of a tribe, due to their binding of the infant’s skull, to nomos, but he believed that this would become hereditary (physis). In medicine of the fifth century B.C., physis came to mean normal[7].
翻譯:
Pindar( 522-433年)認為,所有人類的真正能力是與生俱來的。而這些能力是不能透過學習而習得,只能靠著訓練而進步 [ 6 ] 。對他來說,社會的規則 (指nomos)是上帝賦予的,因此,含有絕對的真理。對巴門尼德和他的學派來說,規則和自然不完全對立。以希臘民族志來看,銘記規則和自然並不是對立也是正確的。被指為人類的所有特點,是由於習俗,而不是由於氣候的影響,國家或食物。因此,Herodotus認為部落中細長的頭顱,是他們對幼兒頭顱的束縛,這歸屬於規則,但他認為,這可成為世襲(自然)。在公元前五世紀的醫學上,自然的到來意味著常態 [ 7 ] 。


原文:
Although we find the nomos-physis antithesis in all Greek philosophy and science, the exact meaning of the terms would have to be determined in each case, before we might claim that one of the philosophers made certain pronouncements about language. We have attempted to indicate that none of the presocratic philosophers were concerned with language as such, nor with questions of its origin or development, and in no case could their statements be said to establish language as cultural or natural to man.
In classical philosophy, the relationship of the name to its object continued to be the focal point in discussions on language: naming and language were synonymous. Did the object determined in some way the name by which it was called, just as its shape determined the image we saw of it? In his dialogue, Cratylos, Plato (427-347) attempted a solution of this problem. If the name was determined by the nature of the object to which it referred, then language was physis, that is, it could be said to reflect the true nature of things, but if it were nomos, then the name could not serve as a source of real knowledge. As Steinthal[8] pointed out, language was taken as given, and the philosophical discussion had not originated from questions about the nature of man or language. Plato’s answer could, therefore, have only indirect implications for questions about language origin which were to arise much later. He overcame the antithesis by demonstrating that the name does not represent the object but that it stands for the idea which we have of the object. Furthermore, he declared that the name or the word is only a sound symbol which in itself does not reveal the truth of the idea it represents. Words gain their meaning from other modes of communication like imitative body movements or noises. The latter are similar to painting in that they are representative but not purely symbolic as is language. The only reference to the origin of language in Cratylos is Socrates’ statement that speaking of a divine origin of words is but a contrivance to avoid a scientific examination of the source of names[10].
翻譯:
雖然我們在所有希臘哲學及科學中找到規則-自然的對立面,但這兩個術語的確切含義都必須分別地在每一種情況下決定,在我們宣稱其中某位哲學家提出對語言的聲明之前。我們試圖表明,沒有任何前蘇格拉底的哲學家像這樣關注語言,也沒有關於語言起源及發展的問題,並在任何情況下,沒有任何聲明關於語言是人類文化及本質的建立。在古典哲學中,名稱和其所指事物的關係仍然是討論語言的焦點問題:命名和語言是同等的。是否用某種方式命名事物,就如同所我們看到的影象決定了事物的外型呢?在他的對話錄中, 《Cratylos》,柏拉圖( 427-347 )試圖解決這一個問題。如果名稱是由其所指對象的本質而決定,那麼語言就是物理,也就是說,語言可以反映事物的真實本質,但如果語言是法則,那麼事物的名稱就不能作為真正的知識來源。如同Steinthal [ 8 ]指出,語言的取得就像它的起源,哲學的討論不是源於人或語言本質的問題。柏拉圖的回答因此可能只有間接影響關於語言起源的問題。他藉著證明名稱不代表其所指對象,但是名稱代表了我們對所指對象的想法,克服了對立面。此外,他宣稱名稱和詞彙只是聲音的象徵,本身並不顯露出它所表示的真理。名稱的意義是從其他溝通方式取得,例如模仿的身體動作或聲音。後者則是類似繪畫,因為它們是呈現性的,但並非純粹是語言的象徵。在對話錄中唯一提到語言起源的是蘇格拉底的發言,談到了詞的神源說,但這卻是為了避免科學對名稱來源檢驗的計謀 [ 10 ] 。

LB371-374 T

原文:
Cognition is regarded as the behavioral manifestation of physiological processes. Form and function are not arbitrarily superimposed upon the embryo from the outside but gradually develop through a process of differentiation. The basic plan is based on information contained in the developing tissues. Some functions need an extra organismic stimulus for the initiation of operation-something that triggers the cocked mechanisms; the onset of air-breathing in mammals is an example. These extra-organismic stimuli do not shape the ensuing function. A species’ peculiar mode of processing visual input, as evidenced in pattern recognition, may develop only in individuals who have had a minimum of exposure to properly illuminated objects in the environment during their formative years. But the environment clearly does not shape the mode of input processing, because the environment might have been the background to the visual development of a vast number of other types of pattern-recognition.
翻譯:
認知被視為生理過程的行為表現。其形式和功能並非任意地從外在重疊加在胚胎上,而是透過分化的過程而逐漸發展。基本的計劃是依據發展中的組織,其內所顯示的資訊而決定。有些功能另外需要有機體的刺激來引發機制而開始運作;像是哺乳動物的呼吸起始就是一個例子。這些額外的有機體刺激並不影響隨後功能的發展。一個物種處理視覺輸入的特殊方式,如模式識別中所顯現,可能只在對某些個體中發展。但是顯然地環境並不是決定輸入過程形式的形成,因為環境可能是其它大量模式識別中,其視覺發展的背景。

原文:
(iv) At birth, man is relatively immature; certain aspects of his behavior and cognitive function emerge only during infancy. Man’s postnatal state of maturity (brain and behavior) is less advanced than that of other primates. This is a statement of fact and not a return to the fetalization and neotony theories of old (details in Chapter Four).
翻譯:
在出生時,人類相當地不成熟;某些方面的行為和認知功能只有在嬰兒期出現。人類產後狀態的成熟度(大腦和行為)比其他靈長類動物是較不先進的。這是對事實的陳述,而不是回到關於胎型和幼期性熟的理論(詳情見第四章)。

原文:
(v) Certain social phenomena among animals come about by spontaneous adaptation of the behavior of the growing individual to the behavior of other individuals around him. Adequate environment does not merely include nutritive and physical conditions; many animals require specific social conditions for proper development. The survival of the species frequently depends on the development of mechanisms for social cohesion or social cooperation. The development of typical social behavior in a growing individual requires, for many species, exposure to specific stimuli such as the presence of certain action patterns in the mother, a sexual partner, a group leader, etc. sometimes mere exposure to social behavior of other individuals is a sufficient stimulus. For some species the correct stimulation must occur during a narrow formative period in infancy; failing this, further development may become seriously and irreversibly distorted. In all types of developing social behavior, the growing individual begins to engage in behavior as if by resonance; he is maturationally ready but will not begin to perform unless properly stimulated. If exposed to the stimuli, he becomes socially“excited”as a resonator may become excited when exposed to a given range of sound frequencies. Some social behavior consists of intricate patterns, the development of which is the result of subtle adjustments to and interactions with similar behavior patterns (for example, the songs of certain bird species). An impoverished social input may entail permanently impoverished behavior patterns.
翻譯:
動物中某些社會現象的出現是源自於成長的個體對其他周圍個體所做的自然調整行為。適當的環境不只包括營養和生理狀況;許多動物為了適當的發展需要特定的社交條件。物種的生存往往取決於社會凝聚力和社交合作的發展機制。一個成長的個體,其典型社交行為的發展,對許多物種來說必需暴露於特定的刺激,例如某種母性行為模式、性伴侶及族群領導者的出現等。有時僅接觸其他個體的社交行為是足夠的刺激。對於某些物種來說,正確的刺激必須發生在嬰兒時的形成時期;如果錯過了這個時期,進一步的發展有可能變成嚴重且不可逆轉的變型。在所有發展中的社交行為中,成長中的個體開始處理行為就好比共振;他是已做好完全準備,但並不會開始執行,除非受到適當刺激。如果暴露於刺激,他會受社交而激動就像諧振器可能變得興奮,當它暴露於某一特定頻率範圍的聲音中。有些是由錯綜複雜的模式所組成,而社交行為的發展,是對類似行為模式所做的些微調整以及互動的結果,(例如,某種鳥類的歌曲)。貧乏的社交輸入可能造成長久的貧乏行為模式。

2008年12月7日 星期日

C1. The Conceptual Framework-VI.Conclusion T

In this chapter we have covered a vast territory citing embryological, anatomical, physiological, and genetic facts pertinent to a great variety of animals. The aim of these excursions was to provide a panorama of the many aspects of the study of behavior and the scientific approaches to this study. We wished to demonstrate the intimate relationship between behavior and biological phenomena in general. We shall, in subsequent chapters, focus on language, but from the foregoing discussions it will be apparent that a biology of language must go far beyond the traditional subjects, namely beyond a demonstration that man is not the only communicating animal, and that certain animal experiments are analogous to language acquistion. Instead, we may expect that language, just as the other types of behavior disucssed in this chapter, is determined to a large extent by biological potentialities.

在這一章,我們涵蓋了廣大的範圍,指出胚胎學、解剖學、生理學及遺傳學和許多動物有關。會提及這些那麼遠的學科,其主要目的是為了提供對行為研究及它的科學方法一個全面性的概觀。我們希望能證明行為和生物現象之間的密切關係。我們在後面的章節,將集中於語言部分,但是根據前面的討論,會很明顯的顯示出語言的生物面一定遠遠超過傳統的議題,也就是證明人類不是唯一會溝通的動物,並且某些動物實驗和語言習得類似。 取而代之的是,我們期待語言,就像本章討論到的其它行為一樣,是被生物的潛能性所決定。

We have come to the following conclusions in the previous sections. The central nervous system and other tissues in the body develop simultaneously and influence one another continuously during morphogenesis. Also, the internal architecture of bones is in part influenced by muscle tonus, which in turn depends on central nervous system activity. As soon as embryonic tissues are sufficiently differentiated movement and primitive stages of behavior appear, and these develop pari passu with further embryonic development. In mammals and most birds, individuals emerge into the world after a complex ontogenetic history in which behavioral differentiation played as important a role as tissue differentiation. Once the individual mammal attains freedom from the intrauterine influence, he is neither a passive tool that may be put to any arbitrary use nor a tabula rasa into which behavior can be arbitrarily inscribed. There are biological limits to its future behavioral repertoire, and these express themselves as species-specificities. Such specificities are ever present and there is no behavior (including language) that is exempt from them. In many animals there is a certain degree of plasticity, but the building blocks of any behavior however arbitrarily it might have been shapted by exterior forces, remain species-specific reflexes, sensitivities, and motor patterns. Genetic transmission appears to play an important role in the fundamental nature of behavioral building blocks and their propagation through animal populations. There is in certain instances a developmental connection between the morphological charateristics and the behavioral characteristics of a species. However, a simple inspection of form does not ordinarily allow us to predict the complete behavioral characteristics of the animal. But if the animal's behavior is well-known, some of its morphological characteristics can then be related to function.

從前面幾節,我們達成了以下幾個結論。中樞神經系統和其它身體上的組織同時發展並且在形態生成的過程中不斷地互相影響。此外,骨骼的內部結構會某種程度上地受到肌緊張的影響,而肌肉的緊張則取決於中樞神經系統的活動 。只要胚胎的組織一經過充分的分化,行為的動作和行為的原始階段就會出現,而且這些發展和進一步的胚胎發展同種速度。在哺乳類以及大多數的鳥類,個體的出生是經過一個複雜的發育歷程,而行為的分化在這個歷程中所扮演的角色就像組織分化一樣重要。一個個体哺乳類一旦不受母體的影響而取得自由,他就不是一個被任意使用的工具,也不是一個被任意銘記行為的白板。他更深一層的行為功能會受到生物上的限制,這些都能從他自己顯現出生物特有的性質。像這樣的特殊性一直都存在著,而且也沒有行為(包含語言)可以被免除。許多動物都具有某種程度的可塑性,但是生物的特殊性阻擋了任何的行為。基因的傳承似乎在行為建構材料的基礎本質中和動物族群的繁殖中扮演了重要的角色。 然而,對一個形式的簡單檢驗通常不允許我們預測動物完整的行為特性。 但是,如果動物的行為是眾所週知的,它的某些構詞特性就和功能有關。

In our investigations of biological foundations of language we shall examine anatomical and phsiological correlates: we shall attempt to follow the emergence of language through growth and maturation; and we shall attempt to see language in the context of the science of evolution. These and related matters must, by necessity, be treated in individual chapters. Yet none of these topics by themselves is likely to give us definitive clues to the biological nature of language. Each produces circumstantial evidence. only a synopsis of the entire material will give us a picture, however hazy, of the immensely intricate design of the whole.

在我們對語言的生物基礎研究中,我們將檢視解剖和生理的相關之處;我們將試圖從發育及成熟的過程注意語言的出現。而且,我們將試圖檢視語言的進化面。這些以及相關的事物都一定且必需要在獨立的章節中討論。雖然這些主題都還沒有提供我們對語言的生物本質一些可靠的線索。每個主題都是有關的證據。然而,只有全部資料的概要才會給我們一個輪廓,雖然朦朧但卻是錯綜複雜的圖樣。

LB 066-071 T

Lesions in man’s left hemisphere, on the other hand, are conspicuous for their interference with verbal activity. Yet they are statistically less likely (Milner, 1962) (Weinstein, 1962) to interfere with general, nonverbal perceptual and cognitive functions than similar lesions in the right hemisphere, particularly in the temporal lobes. The lateralization of function is not present at birth and may be influenced by lesions and disease suffered in early childhood (Chapter four). It is interesting that the corpus callosum, the heavy strand of fiber tracts which most immediately connect the cortices of the two hemispheres, is not essential for the acquisition of speech. Several cases of congenital agenesis of the corpus callosum have been reported in the literature, and it is clear that this deformity need not result in language learning difficulties. It is not known whether it prevents the establishment of cerebral lateralization. (For the relationship between handedness and speech lateralization, see Chapter four.)

另一方面來看,人類左腦的損害,對口語動作的干擾是顯而易見的。然而在統計上,比起相似的損害在右腦,在左腦的損害較不可能干擾一般的、非口語感覺及認知功能,特別是在顳葉內。側化的功能並不是在出生時就出現而且有可能是受到器官損害以及幼年早期所患疾病的影響(第四章)。有趣的是胼胝體,這個含有大串的神經纖維是最直接地連結左右腦大腦皮質的道路,但對口語的習得卻不是必要的。據文獻上的報導,有幾個先天胼胝體發育不全的案例,而這種缺陷對導致語言學習的困難不是必要的。大家並不知道是否它妨礙了大腦側化的建立。(慣用手和語言側化的關係,見第四章。)


(5) Relative Size of the BrainThere has been much discussion about man’s relatively large brain and its specific relationship to language. Although the thesis of this book would be much strengthened if we could demonstrate a necessary and sufficient connection between these typically human structural and behavioral developments, a closer examination of the various aspects of brain size reveals several unsolved problems.

(5)腦的相對大小
已經有許多關於人類大腦以及它對語言特有關係的討論。若我們能證明這些人類結構和行為的發展之間有著必要且足夠的關聯,雖會會使這本書的論點更加穩固,然而對於腦的大小多種面向的嚴密調查更會透露出幾個尚未解決的問題。

First, there are problems of measurement. The relevance of average body weight in relation to brain weight is not obvious. For instance, the variance of body weights is much greater than that of brain weights. Even in a single, mature individual, the body weight may fluctuate considerably, whereas the brain weight tends to be quite constant. When different species are compared, additional problems emerge. The weight and volume of the body may vary with density of tissues (especially bones), and this can interfere with the commensurability of the brain-weight/body-weight ratios. For some animals it is advantageous to carry around a great deal of dead or energy-storing tissue, whereas others must travel as lightly as possible. Starck (1965) who has reviewed the recent literature on the encephalization problem has expressed similar criticisms and suggests that intra-cerebral proportions of tissues might provide more important and interesting quotients for taxonomic purposes than the brain-weight/body-weight ratio.

首先,是測量上的問題。平均體重和腦重量的關聯性並不明顯。舉例來說,體重的變動比腦重量的變動大多了。即使是一個單獨的、成熟的個體,體重也可能變動相當大,反之,腦重量卻傾向於相當地固定。當比較不同的物種時,就會浮現出附加的問題。身體的重量和體積可能會隨著組織的密度而不同(特別是骨骼),並且這會干擾腦重量/體重比例的可公度性。對某些動物來說,能隨身攜帶大量的廢棄的或貯存能量的組織是有利的,反之,對於其它的動物來說卻是儘可能地愈輕便愈好。Starck(1965)重新檢閱了最近關於腦體重比增加化問題的文獻,他表達了類似的評論並且建議組織的腦內比率可能比 腦重量/體重 的比率更能提供分類目的一個更重要且有趣的數字。

It may also be well to remember that data may be plotted in many different ways. The direct comparison of measurements may often obscure lawful relationships, particularly when these are nonlinear. Dodgson (1962), for instance, has plotted brain-weight/body-weight relationship on double-logarithmic scales (Fig. 2.24) in which an allometric connection seems to emerge (cf. Chapter six) between brain and body weights that holds for many primates including man. According to this representation, it would seem as if man had kept up with a trend common for the entire order, whereas the great apes were the deviants. However, we should not be so misled by this graph to think that there is nothing peculiar about the dimensions of man’s brain. It is of an extraordinary size and is quite obviously capable of functions that differ qualitatively and quantitatively from that of other animals.

牢記資料有很多不同的測劃方法是可取的。直接比較的測量方式通常會遮掩了法定的關係,特別是當它們是非線性的。例如,Dodgson (1962),用雙對數標度 (Fig. 2.24)測劃了腦重量/體重的關係,在表中似乎浮現了腦重和體重之間有著異速生長的關聯,這適用於靈長類動物,而人類也包含在內。根據這個圖表,人類似乎有趕上整個普遍規律的趨勢,而大猿卻是反常。然而,我們不該受這個圖表的誤導而誤認為人腦的大小一點都不獨特。人腦異常的大小,因此很明顯地在品質上及數量上有不同於其它動物的功能。

A further reason why a simple comparison of a few selected weights is not very revealing is due to the changing proportions of organ weights, including the brain, through growth and development (for details, see Chapter four). The brain-body weight ratios are, for all mammals, different at birth than in maturity. Pertinent data for the primate order have been collected by Schultz (1941) who has shown that it is possible to match a quotient that is typical for mature man by a similar quotient of a subhuman primate but at a more primitive stage of development. Thus the growth histories peculiar to a species are more interesting than the comparison of any single absolute measurement. The growth history of the human brain is quite different from that of other primates.

將一些挑選出來的重量所作的簡單對照並不相當發人省思的更進一步原因是因為器官的重量 (包含腦) 的變化比率,是起因於成長及發展(詳情,見第四章)。對所有的哺乳類來說,腦-身體重量的比例在出生就不同,勝於成熟後。Schultz (1941)已經蒐集到相關的資料,他指出成熟人類的商數(指腦重量/體重)可能比得上低於人類的靈長類的類似商數,但是是在更早期的發展階段。因此,物種特有的成長歷程比完全單方面測量的比較更加有趣。人腦的成長歷程和其它靈長類相比是非常不同的。

A second realm of problems concerns the interpretation of the significance of relative and absolute increase in brain size. Man does not only differ from animals in his capacity for language but also in his general cognitive capacities. It may well be that the large-sized brain and the absolute increase in cell number and axodendritic density have increased man’s psychological storage capacity, the capacity for simultaneous processing of input and output, and the combinatorial possibilities among specific processes. In modern man, a failure of brain growth, such as in microcepyhaly, apparently results in lowering of these functions if the condition is severe enough. But it is interesting that language function is comparatively independent (in modern man—the argument must not be extended indiscriminately to fossil forms) from both brain size and variations in cognitive capacities. These phenomena are discussed in greater detail elsewhere in the book. Here we are merely interested in the relationship between brain size and language capacity.

第二個問題的範圍關係著理解相對的及完全的增加腦的大小的重要性。人類不同於動物的不只是語言的能力,還包含一般的認知能力。大尺寸的腦和細胞數目的絕對增加以及軸突末端與樹突交接處的密度已增加了人類心理上的儲存能力,這是同時處理輸入和輸出的能力,組合的可能。在現代人類中,大腦成長過程的失敗,像是小腦症,假設這個情況十分嚴重,很顯然地會導致這些功能的減弱。但是有趣的是語言的功能相對地獨立於(在現代人類中,絕不能任意的擴大這個論點) 腦的大小及認知能力的差異兩者。這些現象在本書的其它處有更詳細的討論。在這我們只關注於腦的大小和語言能力之間的關係。

Would it be possible at least to learn to understand a natural language such as English with a brain of markedly different weight and brain-body weight ratio? The answer is yes: as far as modern man is concerned, neither the absolute nor relative weight of the brain is the necessary factor for language-learning potentiality. There is a clinical condition, first described and named nanocephalic dwarfism (bird-headed dwarfs, as they are sometimes called), by the German pathologist, Virchow, in which man appears reduced to fairy-tale size. Seckel (1960) has recently described two such dwarfs and has reviewed the scientific literature on thirteen others. He ascribes the condition to a single-locus recessive gene for dwarfish stature without affecting endocrine organs and function. Adult individuals attain a maximum height of three feet, and about half of the described patients stand not much higher than two and a half feet at adult age; the shortest adult mentioned measured 23 inches.

是否以明顯不同的腦重量及腦-身體重量的比例來學著理解一個自然的語言,像是英語,是有可能的?答案是肯定的。就現代人類而言,絕對的及相對的腦重量這兩者都不是語言學習潛力的必要因素。有一個臨床的病症,最初被德國的病理學家,Virchow,描述及命名為小腦侏儒症(有時又被稱作鳥頭樣侏儒),這個病狀是人腦會縮小到像不真實的大小。Seckel(1960)最近描敘了兩個像這類的侏儒者並且評論了關於十三個侏儒者的科學上的文獻。他將這種病況歸因於像侏儒身高的隱性基因缺乏影響內分泌的器官及功能。成人最高的身高可達到三英尺,而這些描敘的病患中,大約有一半在成人年齡站立著仍沒有高於兩尺半;前提中最矮的成人測得為23英吋。

Nanocephalic dwarfs differ from other dwarfs in that they preserve the skeletal proportions of normal adults. The fully mature have a brain-body weight ratio well within the limits of a young teen-ager. Yet their head circumference and estimated brain weight barely exceeds those of a newborn infant as shown in Fig. 2.25. On microscopic examination, these brains have an unremarkable histological appearance; both the size of individual nerve cells and the density of their distribution is thought to be within normal limits. However, these brains probably differ substantially from normal adult ones in the absolute number of cells. Intellectually, these dwarfs show some retardation for the most part, often not surpassing a mental age level of five to six years. All of them acquire the rudiments of language including speaking and understanding, and the majority master the verbal skills at least as well as a normal five-year-old child. From table 2.2 it is apparent that neither the absolute nor relative weights of brains and bodies reveal the nature of the relationship between speech and its neurological correlates. Apparently, the organization of the brain is more important for language than its mass, and the entire matter must be discussed in the light of developmental processes and growth. Perhaps growth brings about organization within the brain which does have structural correlates on a molecular level, and in this sense speech and language may have a concrete structural basis. But at the present time, we have no techniques which could demonstrate the structural characteristics of a brain whose owner learned to speak at a normal age to distinguish it from certain brains whose owner had a congenital language disability without other neurological abnormalities.

小腦侏儒不同於其它的侏儒的地方是他們仍存有正常成人的骨骼比例。完全發展成熟的腦-身體重量比例正好在青少年的範圍內。他們的腦圓周和估計的腦重量僅僅超越剛出生嬰兒的腦,如表 2.25所示。在小腦症的調查中,這些腦有著一般的組織學外觀;神經細胞的大小及它們分佈的密度這兩者都被認為是在正常的範圍內。然而,這些腦大致上不同於正常成人可能是在於細胞的完全數量。智能上來說,這些侏儒在大部分都顯示了一些遲緩,通常不是出眾的。他們全都習得了語言的基礎,包含說話及理解,並且大部分都掌握了至少像正常五歲兒童的口語技巧。顯然地從表2.2中指出絕對的或相對的腦-身體重量兩者皆不能顯示口語和神經之間關係的本質。看來,腦的組織對語言比對它的本體更加重要。但在現階段,我們並沒有儀器可以證明並且區分能使人類在適當年齡學會說話的腦結構特性及某些具有先天語言障礙卻沒有其它神經異常者的腦結構特性。

2008年12月6日 星期六

Preface- Paragraph 8 T

Throughout these years, I have enjoyed the financial support of the National Institutes of Health, U. S. Public Health Service, grants MH-02921, M-5268, 1-K-3-MH-21700, and National Science Foundation GS-300. Finally,I would like to express my gratitude to Eleanor F. Rosenberger, who has been responsible for typing and retyping the manuscript, for a gigantic editorial job and for patient library research.
Cambridge, Mass. E.H. L.

整整這些年來,我享有了來自美國國家衛生院及美國公共衛生服務處財務上的資助,補助了研究計劃MH-02921、M-5268及1-K-3-MH-21700,美國國家科學基金會補助了研究計畫GS-300。最後,我想表達我對Elanor F. Roseberger的感激之情,他負責了打字及校正原稿、大量的編輯工作以及耐心的圖書研究。

2008年11月11日 星期二

LB 066-071

Lesions in man’s left hemisphere, on the other hand, are conspicuous for their interference with verbal activity. Yet they are statistically less likely (Milner, 1962) (Weinstein, 1962) to interfere with general, nonverbal perceptual and cognitive functions than similar lesions in the right hemisphere, particularly in the temporal lobes. The lateralization of function is not present at birth and may be influenced by lesions and disease suffered in early childhood (Chapter four). It is interesting that the corpus callosum, the heavy strand of fiber tracts which most immediately connect the cortices of the two hemispheres, is not essential for the acquisition of speech. Several cases of congenital agenesis of the corpus callosum have been reported in the literature, and it is clear that this deformity need not result in language learning difficulties. It is not known whether it prevents the establishment of cerebral lateralization. (For the relationship between handedness and speech lateralization, see Chapter four.)
(5) Relative Size of the Brain
There has been much discussion about man’s relatively large brain and its specific relationship to language. Although the thesis of this book would be much strengthened if we could demonstrate a necessary and sufficient connection between these typically human structural and behavioral developments, a closer examination of the various aspects of brain size reveals several unsolved problems.
First, there are problems of measurement. The relevance of average body weight in relation to brain weight is not obvious. For instance, the variance of body weights is much greater than that of brain weights. Even in a single, mature individual, the body weight may fluctuate considerably, whereas the brain weight tends to be quite constant. When different species are compared, additional problems emerge. The weight and volume of the body may vary with density of tissues (especially bones), and this can interfere with the commensurability of the brain-weight/body-weight ratios. For some animals it is advantageous to carry around a great deal of dead or energy-storing tissue, whereas others must travel as lightly as possible. Starck (1965) who has reviewed the recent literature on the encephalization problem has expressed similar criticisms and suggests that intra-cerebral proportions of tissues might provide more important and interesting quotients for taxonomic purposes than the brain-weight/body-weight ratio.
It may also be well to remember that data may be plotted in many different ways. The direct comparison of measurements may often obscure lawful relationships, particularly when these are nonlinear. Dodgson (1962), for instance, has plotted brain-weight/body-weight relationship on double-logarithmic scales (Fig. 2.24) in which an allometric connection seems to emerge (cf. Chapter six) between brain and body weights that holds for many primates including man. According to this representation, it would seem as if man had kept up with a trend common for the entire order, whereas the great apes were the deviants. However, we should not be so misled by this graph to think that there is nothing peculiar about the dimensions of man’s brain. It is of an extraordinary size and is quite obviously capable of functions that differ qualitatively and quantitatively from that of other animals.
FIG. 2.24. Weight ratios of brain and body of selected primates. (After Dodgson, 1962)

A further reason what a simple comparison of a few selected weights is not very revealing is due to the changing proportions of organ weights, including the brain, through growth and development (for details, see Chapter four). The brain-body weight ratios are, for all mammals, different at birth than in maturity. Pertinent data for the primate order have been collected by Schultz (1941) who has shown that it is possible to match a quotient that is typical for mature man by a similar quotient of a subhuman primate but at a more primitive stage of development. Thus the growth histories peculiar to a species are more interesting than the comparison of any single absolute measurement. The growth history of the human brain is quite different from that of other primates.
A second realm of problems concerns the interpretation of the significance of relative and absolute increase in brain size. Man does not only differ from animals in his capacity for language but also in his general cognitive capacities. It may well be that the large-sized brain and the absolute increase in cell number and axodendritic density have increased man’s psychological storage capacity, the capacity for simultaneous processing of input and output, and the combinatorial possibilities among specific processes. In modern man, a failure of brain growth, such as in microcepyhaly, apparently results in lowering of these functions if the condition is severe enough. But it is interesting that language function is comparatively independent (in modern man—the argument must not be extended indiscriminately to fossil forms) from both brain size and variations in cognitive capacities. These phenomena are discussed in greater detail elsewhere in the book. Here we are merely interested in the relationship between brain size and language capacity.
Would it be possible at least to learn to understand a natural language such as English with a brain of markedly different weight and brain-body weight ratio? The answer is yes: as far as modern man is concerned, neither the absolute nor relative weight of the brain is the necessary factor for language-learning potentiality. There is a clinical condition, first described and named nanocephalic dwarfism (bird-headed dwarfs, as they are sometimes called), by the German pathologist, Virchow, in which man appears reduced to fairy-tale size.

FIG. 2.25. Brain weights determined at autopsy plotted as function of patients' chronological age; data from Coppoletta and Wolbach (1993). Bottom plot: various measurements of head-circumference of patient described by Seckel (1960), converted to estimates of brain weight.

Seckel (1960) has recently described two such dwarfs and has reviewed the scientific literature on thirteen others. He ascribes the condition to a single-locus recessive gene for dwarfish stature without affecting endocrine organs and function. Adult individuals attain a maximum height of three feet, and about half of the described patients stand not much higher than two and a half feet at adult age; the shortest adult mentioned measured 23 inches.
Nanocephalic dwarfs differ from other dwarfs in that they preserve the skeletal proportions of normal adults. The fully mature have a brain-body weight ratio well within the limits of a young teen-ager. Yet their head circumference and estimated brain weight barely exceeds those of a newborn infant as shown in Fig. 2.25. on microscopic examination, these brains have an unremarkable histological appearance; both the size of individual nerve cells and the density of their distribution is thought to be within normal limits. However, these brains probably differ substantially from normal adult ones in the absolute number of cells. Intellectually, these dwarfs show some retardation for the most part, often not surpassing a mental age level of five to six years. All of them acquire the rudiments of language including speaking and understanding, and the majority master the verbal skills at least as well as a normal five-year-old child. From table 2.2 it is apparent that neither the absolute nor relative weights of brains and bodies reveal the nature of the relationship between speech and its neurological correlates.
Table 2.2.

Figures in last four lines are estimates based on :
1 Seckel (1964)
2 Schultz(1941)
3 Schultz(1941)
4Kroeber(1948).

Apparently, the organization of the brain is more important for language than its mass, and the entire matter must be discussed in the light of developmental processes and growth. Perhaps growth brings about organization within the brain which does have structural correlates on a molecular level, and in this sense speech and language may have a concrete structural basis. But at the present time, we have no techniques which could demonstrate the structural characteristics of a brain whose owner learned to speak at a normal age to distinguish it from certain brains whose owner had a congenital language disability without other neurological abnormalities.

Antonio Damasio



António Damasio, GOSE, pron. IPA: [ɐ̃'tɔniu dɐ'maziu], (IPA: [ɐ̃'tɔniu dɐ'maziu]) (b. 1944, Lisbon, Portugal) is a behavioral neurologist and neuroscientist. He is David Dornsife Professor of Neuroscience at the University of Southern California, where he heads USC's Brain and Creativity Institute. Prior to taking up his posts at USC, in 2005, Damasio was M.W. Van Allen Professor and Head of Neurology at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Iowa City, Iowa, United States. His career at Iowa lasted from 1976-2005. Besides being a well-known researcher in several areas of the neurology, he is a best-selling author of books which describe his scientific thinking.



Life and work
Damasio studied medicine at the University of Lisbon Medical School in Portugal, where he also did his medical residency rotation and completed his doctorate. Later, he moved to the United States as a research fellow at the Aphasia Research Center in Boston. His work there on behavioral neurology was done under the supervision of Norman Geschwind.
As a researcher, Dr. Damasio's main interest is the neurobiology of the mind, especially neural systems which subserve memory, language, emotion, and decision-making. His research has helped to elucidate the neural basis for the emotions and has shown that emotions play a central role in social cognition and decision-making.
As a clinician, he and his collaborators study and treat the disorders of behavior and cognition, and movement disorders.
Damasio's books deal with the relationship between emotions and feelings, and what are their bases in the brain. His 1994 book, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, was nominated for the Los Angeles Times Book Award and is translated in over 30 languages. His second book, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness, was named as one of the ten best books of 2001 by New York Times Book Review, a Publishers Weekly Best Book of the Year, a Library Journal Best Book of the Year, and has thirty foreign editions. Damasio's most recent book, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain, was published in 2003. In it, Damasio explores philosophy and its relations to neurobiology, suggesting that it might provide guidelines for human ethics.
He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the National Academy of Science's Institute of Medicine, and the European Academy of Arts and Sciences. Damasio has received many awards including the Prince of Asturias Award in Science and Technology, Kappers Neuroscience Medal, the Beaumont Medal from the American Medical Association and the Reenpaa Prize in Neuroscience. He is also in the editorial board of many important journals in the field.
His current work involves the social emotions, decision neuroscience and creativity.
Prof. Damasio is married to Dr. Hanna Damasio, his colleague and co-author of several works.

Antonio Damasio Quotes
Emotions and the feelings are not a luxury, they are a means of communicating our states of mind to others. But they are also a way of guiding our own judgments and decisions. Emotions bring the body into the loop of reason.
Even in the small world of brain science [in the 1860s], two camps were beginning to form. One held that psychological functions such as language or memory could never be traced to a particular region of the brain. If one had to accept, reluctantly, that the brain did produce the mind, it did so as a whole and not as a collection of parts with special functions. The other camp held that, on the contrary, the brain did have specialized parts and those parts generated separate mind functions. The rift between the two camps was not merely indicative of the infancy of brain research; the argument endured for another century and, to a certain extent, is still with us today.

Bibliography
Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, Penguin Books, 1994 - 2005, ISBN 0-380-72647-5
The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness, Harcourt, 1999, ISBN 0-15-100569-6/ Harvest Books, 2000 ISBN 0-15-601075-5
Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain, Harcourt, 2003, ISBN 0-15-100557-5

See also
Brain and Creativity Institute
Cognitive neuropsychology
Embodied philosophy
Embodiment
Emotion
Neuropsychoanalysis
Joseph E. LeDoux
Insular cortex


Related Links
Damasio's USC Faculty page

Antonio Damasio's Wikipedia page

An interview with Antonio Damasio
Review of Damasio's book: The Feeling of What Happens

Review of Damasio's book: Descartes' Error

Harcourt interview with Antonio Damasio
Discover magazine article about Antonio Damasio

Audio of António Damasio's 2003 lecture, "Emotion, Feeling, and Social Behavior: The Brain Perspective"
Ideas of António Damasio - JRSM book review

From
Wikipedia
machineslikeus

2008年11月3日 星期一

C1. The Conceptual Framework ---Reference

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Scott. J. P. and Charles, M. S. (1954). Genetic differences in the behavior of dogs: a case of magnification by thresholds and by habit formation. J. genet. Psychol. 84:175-188.
Searle, L. V. (1949). The organization of hereditary maze-brightness and mazedullness, Genet. Psychol. Monogr. 39:279-325.
Setterfield. W., Schott, R. G., and Snyder, L. H. (1936), Studies in human inheritance:XV. The bimodality of the threshold curve for the taste of phenylthiocarbamide, Ohio J. Sci. 36:231-235
Simpson, G. G. (1949). The Meaning of Evolution: a Study of the History of Life and of its Significance for Man. Yale Univ. Press. New Heaven.
Singer, M. (1947). The nervous system and regeneration of the forelimb of adult triturus. VI. A further study of the importance of nerve number, including quantitative measurements of limb innervation, J. exp. Zool. 104:223-250.
Singer, M. (1959), The influence of nerves on regeneration, in Regeneration in Vertebrates. C. S. Thornton (ed.), pp.59-78. Univ. of Chicago Press. Chicago.
Smith, K. U. and Smith, W. M. (1962), Perception and Motion; An analysis of Space -Structured Behavior. Saunders. Philadelphia.
Sperry, R. W. (1958), Physiological plasticity and brain circuit theory, in Biological and Biochemical Bases of Behavior. H. F. Harlow and C. N. Woolsey (eds.), pp. 401-424. Univ. of Wisconsin Press. Madison.
p.32
Sperry, R. W. (1963), Chemoaffinity in the orderly growth of nerve fiber patterns and connections. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. 50(4):703-710.
Stockard, C. R. (1941) (ed.), The Genetic and Endocrine Basis for Differences in Form and Behavior. Wistar Institute, Philadelphia.
Thompson, D'Arcy W. (1942), On Growth and Form. (2nd ed.) Cambridge Univ. Press, London.
Thompson, W. R. (1953), The inheritance of behaviour: behavioural differences in fifteen mouse strains, Canad. J. Psychol. 7(4):145-155.
Thornton, C. S. and Steen, T. p. (1962), Eccentric blastema formation in aneurogenic limbs of ambystoma larvae following epidermal cap deviation, Develop. Biol. 5:328-343.
Tryon, R. C. (1940). Genetic differencesin maze learning in rats, in National Society for the Study of Education, The Thirty-ninith Yearbook. Public School Publ., Bloomington, Illinois.
Tryon, R. C. (1942). Individual differences in Comparative Psychology. F.A. Moss (ed.), Prentice-Hall , Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
Weiss, P. A. (1950a), An introduction to genetic neurology, in Genetic Neurology. P. A. Weiss (ed.), Univ. of Chicago Press. Chicago.
Weiss, P. A.(1950b), Experimental analysis of coordination by the disarrangement of central-peripheral relations. Physiological Mechanisms in Animal Behavior, Symposia of the Society for Experimental Biology 4:92-111. Academic Press, New York.
Weiss, P. A.(1965), Specificity in the neurosciences: A report of an NRP work session, chaired by P. A. Weiss. Neurosciences Research Program Bulletin 3(5):1-64.
Weiss, P. A. and Brown, P. F. (1941). Electromyographic studies on recoordination of leg movements in poliomyelities patients with transposed tendons, Proc. Soc. exp. Biol. 48:284-287. Weiss, P. A. and Ruch, T. C. (1936), Further observations on the function of supernumerary fingers in man. Proc. Soc. exp. Biol. 34:569-570.
Wiersma, C. A. G. (1931), An experiment on the "resonance theory" of muscular activity, Arch. Neerl. Physiol. 16:337-345.
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2008年10月14日 星期二

C1. The Conceptual Framework -VI.Conclusion

VI. Conclusion

In this chapter we have covered a vast territory citing embryological, anatomical, physiological, and genetic facts pertinent to a great variety of animals. The aim of these excursions was to provide a panorama of the many aspects of the study of behavior and the scientific approaches to this study. We wished to demonstrate the intimate relationship between behavior and biological phenomena in general. We shall, in subsequent chapters, focus on language, but from the foregoing discussions it will be apparent that a biology of language must go far beyond the traditional subjects, namely beyond a demonstration that man is not the only communicating animal, and that certain animal experiments are analogous to language acquistion. Instead, we may expect that language, just as the other types of behavior disucssed in this chapter, is determined to a large extent by biological potentialities.
Vocabulary
embryological: adj,胚胎學的
excursion: n,離題
panorama:n, 全景, 全觀, 概觀


We have come to the following conclusions in the previous sections. The central nervous system and other tissues in the body develop simultaneously and influence one another continuously during morphogenesis. Also, the internal architecture of bones is in part influenced by muscle tonus, which in turn depends on central nervous system activity. As soon as embryonic tissues are sufficiently differentiated movement and primitive stages of behavior appear, and these develop pari passu with further embryonic development. In mammals and most birds, individuals emerge into the world after a complex ontogenetic history in which behavioral differentiation played as important a role as tissue differentiation. Once the individual mammal attains freedom from the intrauterine influence, he is neither a passive tool that may be put to any arbitrary use nor a tabula rasa into which behavior can be arbitrarily inscribed. There are biological limits to its future behavioral repertoire, and these express themselves as species-specificities. Such specificities are ever present and there is no behavior (including language) that is exempt from them. In many animals there is a certain degree of plasticity, but the building blocks of any behavior however arbitrarily it might have been shapted by exterior forces, remain species-specific reflexes, sensitivities, and motor patterns. Genetic transmission appears to play an important role in the fundamental nature of behavioral building blocks and their propagation through animal populations. There is in certain instances a developmental connection between the morphological charateristics and the behavioral characteristics of a species. However, a simple inspection of form does not ordinarily allow us to predict the complete behavioral characteristics of the animal. But if the animal's behavior is well-known, some of its morphological characteristics can then be related to function.
Vocabulary
central nervous system: n, 中樞神經系統
mophogenesis:n,型態生成,指由細胞、組織和器官分化形成生物體的胚胎學過程,及依據潛在機體的遺傳學「藍圖」和周圍環境條件而發育成器官
tonus: n, 肌肉的彈性,( 肌肉)強直性
embryonic: adj,關於胚的; 胚胎的, 胎生的;未發育的, 萌芽期的
tissue:n, (動植物的)組織
pari passu: 按同比例地; 按相同速度
ontogenetic: adj,個體發育的
intrauterine: adj,子宮內的
tabula rasa : n, 白板
inscribe: v,書寫於…; 雕刻於… ;雕刻 (文字);銘記, 牢記
exterior: adj,外部的; 外來的; 外在的
propagation: n,繁殖 ; 傳播 遺傳; 普及


In our investigations of biological foundations of language we shall examine anatomical and phsiological correlates: we shall attempt to follow the emergence of language through growth and maturation; and we shall attempt to see language in the context of the science of evolution. These and related matters must, by necessity, be treated in individual chapters. Yet none of these topics by themselves is likely to give us definitive clues to the biological nature of language. Each produces circumstantial evidence. only a synopsis of the entire material will give us a picture, however hazy, of the immensely intricate design of the whole.

LB 443-446

The history of the biological basis of language

OTTO MARX
Language has been thought of as being the expression of man’s reason, the result of onomatopoeia, invented as a means of communication, considered basic to the formation of society, or simply a gift of God. Each of these definitions of language has been used in the construction of a multitude of language theories[1]. We shall not be concerned with the development of these theories, but limit ourselves to a discussion of the recurrent emergence of the thoughts on the biological basis of language.
The idea that language is on of man’s inherent characteristics, like vision or hearing, is found in some myths on the creation of man[2]. In these myths, language is given to man in conjunction with his senses, so that apparently it was considered on of them, and not part of man’s cultural or social functions ( which are also described as given or taught by the gods). By no means can these assertions of a divine origin be considered antithetical to a natural origin of language; on the contrary, everything natural to man was God’s gift to him.
Between the realm of mythology and science stands the experiment of the Egyptian King Psammetichos of the seventh century B.C. and related by Herodotus ( fifth century B.C.). Psammetichos suppossedly tried to have two children raised by shepherds who never spoke to them in order to see what language they would develop [3]. This experiment is relevant to our discussion in so far as its design implies the belief that children left to themselves will develop language. Psammetichos thought he would be able to demonstrate which language was the oldest, but apparently did not doubt that even untutored children would speak.
Language first became the subject of discussion by the presocratic philosophers in the latter part of the sixth century B.C. The setting up of antitheses, typical for Greek philosophy, was also applied to the problems which language posed. But discussions of language were limited to a mere consideration of naming and were purely secondary outgrowths of the philosopher’s search for general truths. In order to understand the statements on language made by the Greek philosophers, it is essential to give an idea of the context in which they were made and briefly describe the evolution of the meaning of the two everrecurring terms nomos and physis in which language was to be discussed. Nomos was later replaced by theses and was often wrongly translated as convention while physis has been incorrectly equated with nature.
For Herakleitos (ca. 500 B.C.), nomos was the order regulating the life of society and the individual, but he did not see it as a product of society[4].The nomos of society was valid, but not absolute. Similarly names were valid as they reflected some aspect of the object they named. (Apparently, he did not consider them physis as had been thought)[5]. Physis would have implied that names are an adequate expression of reality or of the true nature of things, an idea to which Herakleitos did not subscribe.
Parmenides, (fifth century B.C.) thought that originally names had been given to things on the basis of “wrong thinking,” and that the continued use of the original names perpetuated the errors of men’s earlier thinking about the objects around them. To him, and to Anaxagoras and Empedokles, names and concepts were synonymous. Their concern with conventional names and their condemnation of them as nomos was related to their critical view of conventional thought. To these philosophers nomos and conventional thought had acquired the connotation of incorrectness and inadequacy as opposed to the truth and real nature or physis which they were seeking[5].
Pindar(522-433 B.C.) considered all of man’s true abilities innate. They cannot be acquired by learning but can only be furthered by training[6]. For him the rules of society which are nomos were God-given and, therefore, contained absolute truth. Nomos and physis were not purely antitheticcal as it was for Parmenides and his school. It is also well to keep in mind that nomos and physis had not been antithetical in Greek ethnography. Nomos referred to all peculiarities of a people due to custom and not attributable to the influences of climate, country, or food. So Herodotus had ascribed the elongated heads of a tribe, due to their binding of the infant’s skull, to nomos, but he believed that this would become hereditary (physis). In medicine of the fifth century B.C., physis came to mean normal[7].
Although we find the nomos-physis antithesis in all Greek philosophy and science, the exact meaning of the terms would have to be determined in each case, before we might claim that one of the philosophers made certain pronouncements about language. We have attempted to indicate that none of the presocratic philosophers were concerned with language as such, nor with questions of its origin or development, and in no case could their statements be said to establish language as cultural or natural to man.
In classical philosophy, the relationship of the name to its object continued to be the focal point in discussions on language: naming and language were synonymous. Did the object determined in some way the name by which it was called, just as its shape determined the image we saw of it? In his dialogue, Cratylos, Plato (427-347) attempted a solution of this problem. If the name was determined by the nature of the object to which it referred, then language was physis, that is , it could be said to reflect the true nature of things, but if it were nomos, then the name could not serve as a source of real knowledge. As Steinthal[8] pointed out, language was taken as given, and the philosophical discussion had not originated from questions about the nature of man or language. Plato’s answer could, therefore, have only indirect implications for questions about language origin which were to arise much later. He overcame the antithesis by demonstrating that the name does not represent the object but that it stands for the idea which we have of the object. Furthermore, he declared that the name or the word is only a sound symbol which in itself does not reveal the truth of the idea it represents. Words gain their meaning from other modes of communication like imitative body movements or noises. The latter are similar to painting in that they are representative but not purely symbolic as is language. The only reference to the origin of language in Cratylos is Socrates’ statement that speaking of a divine origin of words is but a contrivance to avoid a scientific examination of the source of names[10].
Aristotle’s (384-322 B.C.) interest in language was both philosophical and scientific. In his book on animals the ten paragraphs devoted to language follow immediately after a discussion of the senses. His differentiation of sound, voice, and language is based on his physical concept of sound production. In his opinion, voice was produced in the trachea and language resulted from the modulation of the voice by tongue and lip movements. Language proper is only found in man. Children babble and stammer because they have not yet gained control over their tongues. Among the animals only the song of birds is similar call ,“kak kak” in one vicinity and “tri tri” in another and as the song of a bird will differ from that of its parents’ if it grows up without them. Language, like the song of the nightingale, is perfected by training.
Aristotle had based his differentiation of man’s language (logos) from the language of animals (phonē) biologically, for he thought that man’s language was produced mainly by movement of the tongue and the sounds of animals by the impact of air on the walls of the trachea. He did not think that human language could have been derived from sounds, noises or the expression of emotions seen in animals and children. “A sound is not yet a word it only becomes a word when it is used by man as a sign.” “The articulated signs (of human language) are not like the expression of emotions of children or animals. Animal noises cannot be combined to form syllables, nor can they be reduced to syllables like human speech”[12]. He rejected an onomatopoeic origin of language and established the primacy of its symbolic function. Because he recognized that the meaning of spoken language was based on agreement, it has been claimed that he thought language to be of cultural origin. I terms of the old antithesis of physis versus nomos, Aristotle saw both principles operative in language. Physis meant to him the law of nature without the virtue of justice which it had contained for Plato, and Nomos was replaced by thesis and had come to mean man made. Language, as such, he considered physis, and the meaning of words he attributed to thesis[13].
The question of the origin of language had not been raised in Greek philosophy until Epicurus (341-271 B.C.) asked: "What makes language possible? How does man form words so that he is understood?”[14]. He concluded that neither God nor reason, but Nature was the source of language. To him, language was a biological function like vision and hearing. A different opinion was held by Zeno (333-262 B.C.) the founder of the Stoa, to whom language was an expression of man’s mind and derived from his reason. He believed that names had been given without conscious reflection or purpose[15].
Although Epicurus had been the first to contemplate the origin of language, Chrysippos (died about 200 B.C.) a stoic, was the first to consider language in terms broader than names. Before him the ambiguity of some names had been noted but no satisfactory explanation had been found. Chrysippos proclaimed that all names were ambiguous and lost their ambiguity by being placed in context. Thereby he drew attention to the importance of the grouping of words but his belief that language did not follow logic kept his inquiry from proceeding any further[16].
* This investigation was supported by a Public Health fellowship(IF3MH-16, 590-01A) from the NIMH.


Note
1. The history of phonetics has been excluded and the reader is referred to the works of Guilo Panconcelli-Calzia, Quellenatlas zur Geschichte d. Phonetik. Hansischer Gilden Verlag, Hamburg, 1940; 3000 Jahre Stimmforschung. Elwert, Marburg, 1961.
2. The theory of a divine origin is only remarkable in that it was vehemently defended so much longer than for other human attributes.
3. For a discusssion of nomos and physis in a medical field, see M. Michler, Hermes, Vol.90, No.4, pp35-401 (October 1962)


References
[1] Revesz Geza, Ursprung & Vorgeschichte d. Sprache, Franke, Bern, 1946, p.103.
[2] Panconcelli-Calzia, G., Quellenatlas zur Geschichte d. Phonetik. Hansischer Gilden Verlag, Hamburg,
1940.
Allen, W. S. Ancient ideas on the origin and development of language, Transactions Philol. Soc.
Londan, 1948, 81,pp, 35 et seq.
[3] The Histories of Herodotus of Halicarnassus. Translated and edited by Harry Carter.
Oxfor University Press, London,1962, p. 202.
[4] Heinimann, Felix, Nomos und Physis. Reinhardt, Basel, 1945, p.59.
[5]____. Pp.53,92.
[5a]._____.Pp. 50 et seq.
[6]____.Pp. 67, 99.
[7]._____Pp. 15-16, 95-97.
[8] Steinthal, Heyman, Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei Griechen und Roemern.
Duemmler, Berlin 1863, p. 86.
[9]______. P. 147.
[10] Cratylus in Plato. Bollingen LXXI, E Hamilton and H. Cairns (eds.), Pantheon, 1961, pp.471-
474
[11] Aristotesles Thierkunde, translated by H, Aubert and F. Wimmer, Engelmann, Leipzig,
1868, pp. 101-111.
[12] Steinthal, Heyman, op.cit., pp. 183, 247, 248. Aristoeles De Anima. translated by K. Foster
and S. Humphries, Routledge, London, 1951. sec. 477.
[13] ______. Pp. 317 et seq.
[14] ______. P312.
[15] Borst, A, op. cit. p.137.
Steinthal, H. op. cit., pp. 166.280.
[16] ______. P. 488.

2008年10月7日 星期二

LB 371-374

Chapter Nine
Toward a biological theory of language development
(General summary)
We have discussed language from many different aspects, have drawn various conclusions and offered a variety of explanations. If we now stand back and survey the entire panorama, will this synopsis suggest an integrated theory? I believe it will.

I. FIVE GENERAL PREMISES

The language theory to be proposed here is based upone the following five empirically verifable, general biological premises.

(i) Congitive function is species-specific. Taxonomies suggest themselves for virtually all aspects of life. Formally. these taxonomies are always type-token hierarchies, and on every level of the hierarchy we may discern differences among tokens and, at the same time, there are commonalities that assign the tokens logically to a type. The commonalitties are not necessarily more and more abstract theoretical concepts but are suggested by physiological and structural invariances. An anatomical example of such an invariance is cell-constituency-it is common to all organisms. In the realm of sensory perception there are phsiological properties that result in commonalities for entire classes of animals, so that every species has very similar pure stimulus thresh-olds. When we compare behavior across species, we also find certain invariances, for instance, the general effects of reward and punichment. But in each of these examples there are also species differences. Cells combine into a species-specific form; sensations combine to produce species-specific pattern-recognition;and behavioral parameters enter into the elaboration of species-specific action patterns.

Let us focus on the species-psecificities of behvior. There are certain cerebral functions that mediate between sensory input and motor output which we shall call generically cognitive function. The neurophysiology of cognitive function is larely unknown but its behavioral correlates are the propensity for problem solving, the formation of learning sets, the tendency to generalize in certain directions, or the facility for memorizing some but not other conditions. The interaction or integrated patterns of all of these different potentialities produces the cognitive specificities that have induced von Uexkuell, the forerunner of modern ethology, to propose that every species has its own world-view. The phenomenological implications of his formulation may sound old-fashioned today, but students of animal behavior cannot ignore the fact that the differences in cognitive processes (1)are empirically demonstrable and (2) are the correlates of species-specific behavior.


(ii) Specific properties of cognitive function are replicated in every member of the species.
Although there are individual differences among all creatures, the members of one species resemble each other very closely. In every individual a highly invariable type of both form and function is replicated. Individual differences of most characteristics tend to have a normal (Gaussian) frequency distribution and the differences within species are smaller than between species. (We are disregarding special taxonomic problems in species identification.)
The application of these notions to (i) makes it clear that also the cognitive processes and potentialities that are characteristics of a species are replicated in every individual. Notice that we must distinguish between what an individual actually does and what he is capable of doing. The intraspecific similarity holds for the latter, not the former, and the similarity in capacity becomes striking only if we concentrate on the general type and manner of activity and disregard such variables as how fast or how accurately a given performance is carried out.


(iii) Cognitive processes and capacities are differentiated spontaneously with maturation.
This statement must not be confused with the question of how much the environment contributes to development. It is obvious that all development requires an appropriate substrate and availability of certain forms of energy. However, in most cases environments are not specific to just one form of life and development. A forest pond may be an appopriate environment for hundreds of different forms of life. It may support the fertilized egg of a frog or a minnow, and each of the eggs will respond to just those types and forms of energy that are appropriate to it. The frog’s egg will develop into a frog and the minnow’s egg into a minnow. The pond just makes the building stones available, but the organismic architecture unfolds through conditions that are created within the maturing individual.
Vocabulary
minnow: n,『魚』 鯉科小魚
fertilize: v,使土地肥沃, 使…豐饒; 給土地施肥 使豐富, 使充實;『生物』使…受胎, 使…受精
organismic: adj, 有机體的,生物的
unfold: v, 攤開; 打開; 掀開 逐漸表露

Cognition is regarded as the behavioral manifestation of physiological processes. Form and function are not arbitrarily superimposed upon the embryo from the outside but gradually develop through a process of differentiation. The basic plan is based on information contained in the developing tissues. Some fuctions need an extra organismic stimulus for the initiation of operation-something that triggers the cocked mechanisms; the onset of air-breathing in mammals is an example. These extra-organismic stimuli do not shape the ensuing function.a species’ peculiar mode of processing visual input, as evidenced in pattern recognition, may develop only in individuals who have had a minimum of exposure to properly illuminated objects in the environment during their formative years. But the environment clearly does not shape the mode of input processing, because the environment might have been the background to the visual development of a vast number of other types of pattern-recognition.
Vocabulary:
embryo: n, 胎兒,胚胎,胚芽
illuminated: adj, 裝有燈飾的, 有彩飾的


(iv) At birth, man is relatively immature; certain aspects of his behavior and cognitive function emerge only during infancy. Man’s postnatial state of maturity (brain and behavior) is less advanced than that of other primates. This is a statement of fact and not a return to the fetalization and neotony thories of old (details in Chapter Four).
Vocabulary:
fetalization: 胎型
neotony: 新機能產生



(v) Certain social phenomena among animals come about by spontaneous adaptation of the behavior of the growing individual to the behavior of other individuals around him.
Adequate environment
does not merely include nutritive and physical conditions; many animals require specific social conditions for proper development. The survival of the species frequently depednds on the development of mechanisms for social cohesion or social cooperation. The development of typical social behavior in a growing individual requires, for many species, exposure to specific stimuli such as the presence of certain action patterns in the mother, a sexual partner, a group leader, etc. sometimes mere exposure to social behavior of other individuals is a sufficient stimulus. For some species the correct stimulation must occur during a narrow formative period in infancy; failing this, further development may become seriously and irreversibly distorted. In all types of developing social behavior, the growing individual begins to engage in behavior as if by resonance; he is maturationally ready but will not begin to perform unless properly stimulated. If expsed to the stimuli, he becomes socially“excited”as a resonator may become excited when exposed to a given range of sound frequencies. Some social behavior consists of intricate patterns, the development of which is the result of subtle adjustments to and interactions with similar behavior patterns (for example, the songs of certain bird species). An impoverished social input may entail permanently impoverished behavior patterns.
Vocabulary
irreversible: adj, 不能倒逆的; 不能翻轉的,不能撤回的 ; 不能取消的
distorted :adj, 扭曲的, 曲解的
resonator: n , 共鳴器; 共振器
impoverish: v, 使窮困, 使貧瘠; 耗盡…的力氣


Even though the development of social behavior may require an environmental trigger for proper development and function, the triggering stimulus must not be mistaken for the cause that shapes the behavior. Prerequisite social triggering mechanisms do not shape the social behavior in the way Emily Post may shape the manners of a debutante.

Preface Paragraph 8.

Throughout these years, I have enjoyed the financial support of the National Institutes of Health, U. S. Public Health Service, grants MH-02921, M-5268, 1-K-3-MH-21700, and National Science Foundation GS-300. Finally,I would like to express my gratitude to Eleanor F. Rosenberger, who has been responsible for typing and retyping the manuscript, for a gigantic editorial job and for patient library research.

Cambridge, Mass. E.H. L.

Preface Paragraph 1. & Paragraph 1 T

The study of language is pertinent to many fields of inquiry. It is relevant to psychology, anthropology, philosophy, and medicine. It encroaches upon the humanities, as well as upon the social and nature sciences. We may pursue investigations that concentrate on what man has done with or to specific languages; or we may regard language as a natural phenomenon-an aspect of his biological nature, to be studied in the same manner as, for instance, his anatomy. Which of these approaches is to be chosen is entirely a matter of personal curiosity. This book is concerned with the biological aspects of language.


語言學對許多領域的探索是相關的。語言學與心理學、人類學、哲學及醫學相關。它不但侵入人文學科也和社會及自然科學相關。我們要進行的研究集中於人類如何處理語言;或是把語言視為一種自然現象---一種生物的自然面,而它研究的方法就像研究它的解剖學一樣。研究方法的選擇完全出自於個人好奇心。這本書是關注於語言的生物層面。

2008年6月12日 星期四

C17. The Variations, Quantification, and Generalizations of Standard Thai Tones

17.2 Acoustic Analysis of Thai Tones

17.2.1 Aim
(1)to investigate how Thai tones vary when they sit on TBUs of different durations
(2)to find the process involved in these tonal variations

17.2.2 Speakers
number:three
sex:female
native language:Standard Thai
age:25-29
Background: grew up in Bangkok and not have any speech or hearing deficiency

17.2.3 Tokens
The test words:
45% meaningful Standard Thai words
55% nonsense Standard Thai words

The structure of word: C1V(:)C2T
C1 -> nasal /m/,/n/, or /n/,
V -> high or low vowel
C2 -> final nasal /m/, /n/ or /n/, or a final stop /t/ or /k/
T -> mid, low, rising-falling, high , or falling-rising

17.2.4 Tasks

C21. Experimental Methods in the Study of Hindi Geminate Consonants

21.1 Introduction
long consonants=geminates
Purpose:
provide answers about long consonants or geminates, using an experimental approach in the analysis of Hindi geminates.

The specific topics of this paper:
(a)the duration of geminates and of the vowels preceding them
(b) long distance durational effects
(c)the duration of geminates vis-a-vis clusters and of the vowel preceding these
(d)the syllabification of geminates and the issue of their integrity
(e)the status of "apparent"geminates

21.1.1 Some facts about geminates in Hindi:
1.geminates involve the consonantal closure held for a longer period
2.geminates are not two separate consonants
3.geminates occur only intervocalically
4.geminates are always preceded by short vowels

21.1.2 Diachronic data on development of geminates
(1) Examples of geminate formation in the history of Indo-Aryan
Sanskrit bhakta meal, food > Pali/Prakrit bhatta
Sanskrit sapta seven > Pali/Prakrit satta
Sanskrit dugha-milk > MLA duddha-

c12. A perceptual Bridge Between Coronal and Dorsal /r/

12.1 Introduction

Phonetic variation of rhotics /r/ in Swedish dialects:
(1).front(coronal)/r/
(2).back(dorsal)/r/

Region of back /r/ :
western European
English
Italian
Czech
Estonian
working-class varieties of rural communities


The complementary distribution between [R] and [r] in southern Swedish dialects:
/r/: back only in intitial postion , after a short stressed vowel

Front and back /r/ have provided a basis for lexcal contrast in Occitan

Why would [r] change into [R] (or vice versa)?
How does sound change begin?

Purpose :
(1)to establish an articulary-acoustic reference for /r/ types
(2)to evaluate the articulatory-acoustic relationship
(3)to synthesize an /r/ continuum situated in the F2-F3 area in question