LB443-446 T

Parmenides, (fifth century B.C.) thought that originally names had been given to things on the basis of “wrong thinking,” and that the continued use of the original names perpetuated the errors of men’s earlier thinking about the objects around them. To him, and to Anaxagoras and Empedokles, names and concepts were synonymous. Their concern with conventional names and their condemnation of them as nomos was related to their critical view of conventional thought. To these philosophers nomos and conventional thought had acquired the connotation of incorrectness and inadequacy as opposed to the truth and real nature or physis which they were seeking [5].
翻譯：
帕梅尼德斯（公元前五世紀）認為，最初對事物的命名是建立在“錯誤思想”的基礎上，並且延續使用最早的名稱使得人類先前對周圍事物的錯誤看法一直存在著。對他以及對Axaxagoras和Empedokles 來說，名稱和概念是同等的。他們對這些傳統名稱的關注及譴責就是他們對常規思想持批判看法的規則。對這些哲學家來說，概念和常規思想是從錯誤和貧乏的內涵取得，相反於他們正尋找的真理和自然的真正本質[ 5 ] 。

原文：
Pindar(522-433 B.C.) considered all of man’s true abilities innate. They cannot be acquired by learning but can only be furthered by training[6]. For him the rules of society which are nomos were God-given and, therefore, contained absolute truth. Nomos and physis were not purely antithetical as it was for Parmenides and his school. It is also well to keep in mind that nomos and physis had not been antithetical in Greek ethnography. Nomos referred to all peculiarities of a people due to custom and not attributable to the influences of climate, country, or food. So Herodotus had ascribed the elongated heads of a tribe, due to their binding of the infant’s skull, to nomos, but he believed that this would become hereditary (physis). In medicine of the fifth century B.C., physis came to mean normal[7].
翻譯：
Pindar（ 522-433年）認為，所有人類的真正能力是與生俱來的。而這些能力是不能透過學習而習得，只能靠著訓練而進步 [ 6 ] 。對他來說，社會的規則 (指nomos)是上帝賦予的，因此，含有絕對的真理。對巴門尼德和他的學派來說，規則和自然不完全對立。以希臘民族志來看，銘記規則和自然並不是對立也是正確的。被指為人類的所有特點，是由於習俗，而不是由於氣候的影響，國家或食物。因此，Herodotus認為部落中細長的頭顱，是他們對幼兒頭顱的束縛，這歸屬於規則，但他認為，這可成為世襲（自然）。在公元前五世紀的醫學上，自然的到來意味著常態 [ 7 ] 。


原文：
Although we find the nomos-physis antithesis in all Greek philosophy and science, the exact meaning of the terms would have to be determined in each case, before we might claim that one of the philosophers made certain pronouncements about language. We have attempted to indicate that none of the presocratic philosophers were concerned with language as such, nor with questions of its origin or development, and in no case could their statements be said to establish language as cultural or natural to man.
In classical philosophy, the relationship of the name to its object continued to be the focal point in discussions on language: naming and language were synonymous. Did the object determined in some way the name by which it was called, just as its shape determined the image we saw of it? In his dialogue, Cratylos, Plato (427-347) attempted a solution of this problem. If the name was determined by the nature of the object to which it referred, then language was physis, that is, it could be said to reflect the true nature of things, but if it were nomos, then the name could not serve as a source of real knowledge. As Steinthal[8] pointed out, language was taken as given, and the philosophical discussion had not originated from questions about the nature of man or language. Plato’s answer could, therefore, have only indirect implications for questions about language origin which were to arise much later. He overcame the antithesis by demonstrating that the name does not represent the object but that it stands for the idea which we have of the object. Furthermore, he declared that the name or the word is only a sound symbol which in itself does not reveal the truth of the idea it represents. Words gain their meaning from other modes of communication like imitative body movements or noises. The latter are similar to painting in that they are representative but not purely symbolic as is language. The only reference to the origin of language in Cratylos is Socrates’ statement that speaking of a divine origin of words is but a contrivance to avoid a scientific examination of the source of names[10].
翻譯：
雖然我們在所有希臘哲學及科學中找到規則-自然的對立面，但這兩個術語的確切含義都必須分別地在每一種情況下決定，在我們宣稱其中某位哲學家提出對語言的聲明之前。我們試圖表明，沒有任何前蘇格拉底的哲學家像這樣關注語言，也沒有關於語言起源及發展的問題，並在任何情況下，沒有任何聲明關於語言是人類文化及本質的建立。在古典哲學中，名稱和其所指事物的關係仍然是討論語言的焦點問題：命名和語言是同等的。是否用某種方式命名事物，就如同所我們看到的影象決定了事物的外型呢？在他的對話錄中， 《Cratylos》，柏拉圖（ 427-347 ）試圖解決這一個問題。如果名稱是由其所指對象的本質而決定，那麼語言就是物理，也就是說，語言可以反映事物的真實本質，但如果語言是法則，那麼事物的名稱就不能作為真正的知識來源。如同Steinthal [ 8 ]指出，語言的取得就像它的起源，哲學的討論不是源於人或語言本質的問題。柏拉圖的回答因此可能只有間接影響關於語言起源的問題。他藉著證明名稱不代表其所指對象，但是名稱代表了我們對所指對象的想法，克服了對立面。此外，他宣稱名稱和詞彙只是聲音的象徵，本身並不顯露出它所表示的真理。名稱的意義是從其他溝通方式取得，例如模仿的身體動作或聲音。後者則是類似繪畫，因為它們是呈現性的，但並非純粹是語言的象徵。在對話錄中唯一提到語言起源的是蘇格拉底的發言，談到了詞的神源說，但這卻是為了避免科學對名稱來源檢驗的計謀 [ 10 ] 。